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BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Court of Appeals Case
No. 20030212-CA

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
LAYTON CITY, a Utah Municipality,
Defendant/Appellee.

Jurisd iction
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G)(2003).

Issues and Standard of Review
Is an employment claim against a government entity, which sounds in
contract, exempt from the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) (2003)? This issue was raised
and preserved in briefing before the District Court. (R. at 28-36.)
This issue involves the interpretation of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1, et seq. A matter of statutory construction is a

1

question of law, to be reviewed for correctness. See. Taqhipour v. Jerez. 2002
UT 74,^18, 52 P.3d 1252.

Determinative Statutory Provisions
This case is determined by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) (2003), which
states:
Immunity from suit of all government entities is waived as to any
contractual obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights or
obligations shall not be subject to the requirements of Sections 63-30-11,
63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-10-19.

Statement of the Case
This case comes to the Court of Appeals as a result of the district court's
dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court
determined that Plaintiff had not provided notice under the Governmental
Immunity Act and could not, therefore, proceed. This appeal follows.
Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant Layton City. Plaintiff, in her
complaint, alleged that she was constructively terminated in violation of the
Defendant's written policy manual and in violation of her contractual rights of

2

good faith and fair dealing. Because Plaintiff's complaint sounded exclusively in
contract, compliance with the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act
has been waived by the plain terms of the Act itself. Utah Code Ann. § 63-305(1).

Statement of Facts
1.

Plaintiff was constructively terminated from her employment at Layton City
on 2 July 2001. She had been employed for fourteen years as a police
dispatcher.

2.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint on 14 March 2002 in the Second Judicial District
Court for Davis County, Case No. 020800412.

3.

Defendant removed the case to Federal Court asserting that Plaintiff was
attempting to assert an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983. No
such cause of action pleaded or attempted. Ultimately, the United States
District Court dismissed the removed case since there was no basis for
federal jurisdiction.

4.

After the case was dismissed, Plaintiff immediately refiled her complaint in
Second District Court for Davis County, Case no. 020700620. Exhibit B.
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After Plaintiff filed its new complaint, Defendant moved to dismiss the case
under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to comply with the notice
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. This was the first
time Defendant had raised such an issue.
Plaintiff's complaint alleged that she was terminated in violation of an
employment contract, as contained in Defendant's policy manual. Plaintiff
also alleged that her constructive termination was in violation the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. Exhibit B, Complaint.
After briefing1, the District Court, without issuing any memorandum
decision, and without informing Plaintiff, ruled in favor of Defendant and
granted the Motion to Dismiss. The court's decision was communicated
solely to Defendant's counsel by the court clerk. The mechanism of
communication is evidenced by the cover letter Defendant's counsel
submitted to Plaintiff with the draft order. See Exhibit C.

Significantly, Defendant filed its motion to dismiss and memorandum citing
to a number of Utah immunity cases, virtually all of which were tort cases.
Defendant did not cite or analyze the contract provision of the Governmental
Immunity Act. Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition, conversely, raised the
contract provision and provided analysis. Defendant filed no reply memorandum
to Plaintiff's briefing and thus, provided the trial court with no contrary analysis
and did not preserve any counterarguments in the record.
4

8.

No notice of the court's decision was ever provided by the Court to Plaintiff
or Plaintiffs counsel.

9.

The Court entered the Order prepared by Defendant on 19 February 2003,
from which Plaintiff timely appeals. Exhibit A.

Summary of Argument
Plaintiff was constructively terminated from her employment with Defendant
Layton City. Following her termination, Plaintiff sued the city for breach of its
contractual obligations. Under the plain language of the Governmental Immunity
Act, immunity was waived for Plaintiff's claim and compliance with the terms of
the Act was also waived. The district court's determination -without analysisthat Plaintiff's claims were barred by the Governmental Immunity Act was
incorrect as a matter of law. The statutory language is clear, as are the decisions
of courts interpreting it. Plaintiff's claims should be allowed to proceed. The
district court's decision should be reversed and this matter remanded for further
proceedings.

5

Argument
I.

Under the Plain Language of the Utah Government Immunity Act,
Plaintiff Was Not Required to Comply with Statutory Notice
Requirements.
Plaintiffs complaint sounds in contract. Her claims are for a constructive

termination in violation of the Defendant's written policy manual and the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. A contract claim could not be more clearly stated.
Claims against municipalities, including contract claims, are subject to the terms
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§63-30-1, et seq.
(2003). Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1) (2003) provides for a general claim of
immunity, subject to the exceptions detailed in the Act: "Except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit
for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental function..."
The Act contains numerous areas of the law for which sovereign immunity
is waived. For example, the Act waives immunity for actions involving possession
or title to real or personal property. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-6 (2003).

The Act

waives immunity for certain cases of negligence. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-7,
63-30-10 (2003). The Act also waives immunity from suit in actions involving
injuries sustained from unsafe public roads and buildings. See, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 63-30-8, 63-30-9 (2003). As to each of the foregoing sections, however,
6

persons desirous of pursuing a claim against a governmental entity must still
comply with the notice requirements set forth in the Act.
Contract claims are different. The Act provides, "Immunity from suit of all
governmental entities is waived as to any contractual obligations. Actions arising
out of contractual rights or obligations shall not be subject to the requirements of
Section 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19." Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) (2003).2 Under this section, immunity from suit is waived
as to any actions against governmental entities sounding in contract.
Significantly, not only is sovereign immunity waived by §63-30-5(1), but
compliance with all of the notice and claim provisions contained in the Act is also
waived.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the "Governmental Immunity Act
must be strictly applied." See, Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corrections. 2001 UT
34,1J14, 24 P.3d 958. (Citations omitted.) Statutes should also be construed to
"evince 'the true intent and purpose of the Legislature [as expressed through] the
plain language of the Act,'" and courts should "avoid interpretations that will

2

The only exception to the waiver of actions sounding in contract involves
the Division of Water Resources under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 (2) and is not
applicable to the case at bar.
7

render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative." jd. at 1J15. (Citations
omitted.) The District Court's decision reads Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) out of
the Act and is therefore improper.
Given the numerous diverse areas in which the Act waives immunity or
compliance with the notice provisions of the Act, the proper analytical framework
would include: (1) A consideration of the claim, as set forth in the Complaint,
without reference to the Act or any governmental entity to determine the actual
nature of the claim asserted, i.e., contract, negligence, property, etc.; (2) a
categorization of the claim as actually asserted; (3) a review of the Act to see
whether immunity has been waived and whether compliance with the Act has
been waived; and (4) an application of the plain terms of the Act to the actual
claim. It is essential to the proper application of the Act to engage in a clear,
deliberative analysis to categorize, analyze, and determine governmental
immunity claims. See, Camas Colorado, Inc. v. Board of County Commr's. 36
P.2d 135, 138 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001)(holding that, under Colorado's immunity act,
courts should analyze the claim itself and determine, based upon a classification
of the claim, whether governmental immunity applies). The record fails to reveal
that the trial court engage in any such deliberation.

8

Other courts have demonstrated the proper analysis. For example, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals analyzed a claim for unpaid wages, determined
that such claim arose from a contractual right, and that therefore, sovereign
immunity was waived under an immunity statute similar to Utah's. Paquette v.
County of Durham, 573 S.E.2d 715, 718 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). In another case, a
court concluded that a claim for money had and received, based upon a faulty
civil forfeiture, sounded in contract for immunity analysis purposes. Karpierz v.
Easlev. 31 S.W.2d 505, 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
In this matter, the district court engaged in no such analysis and made no
findings, instead making the bald assertion, "The claims plaintiff has asserted in
her Complaint dated November 25, 2002, are barred by the Governmental
Immunity Act."3 (See. Exhibit A, jf2.) This conclusion is unsupported by the
evidence and is incorrect as a matter of law. Analysis of the claims presented in
Plaintiff's Complaint dictates the opposite outcome on this question. The

3

lt is significant to note that Plaintiff/Appellant did not have the benefit of
even knowing the district court had made a decision. In a strange procedure, the
district court informed Defendant's counsel of its decision. The only notice
Plaintiff had of the decision was the draft copy of the order sent out by
Defendant's counsel. See Letter, Exhibit C. While there is was no actual
impropriety here, it is difficult to explain to non-lawyers that such a procedure is
fair and transparent. Such an approach is certainly ill-advised and fairly raises
the appearance of impropriety to litigants and the public.
9

Complaint makes specific contractually based allegations regarding Plaintiffs use
of sick leave, accounting for hours, and other contractual matters. (See. Exhibit
B, 1ffi 4-11 •) The Complaint alleges that Defendant violated its own written
personnel policies, which have contractual significance, in its treatment of
Plaintiff. (See. Exhibit B, 1T1P2-13,17.) The Complaint also alleges that given the
policy, Plaintiff was treated unfairly, thus implicating the city's contractual
obligation of good faith and fair dealing. (See. Exhibit B, ^|17.) Finally, Plaintiff's
Complaint sought damages that were contractual in nature. Indeed, Plaintiff
made no tort claims whatsoever against the Defendant. Its only claims were
related to Plaintiffs contractual relationship with Layton City. (See. Exhibit B.)
Given the nature of Plaintiff's claims, there is only one possible conclusion
under the plain language of the Government Immunity Act. Plaintiffs' cause of
action sounds in contract. Therefore, Utah has waived immunity, as well as
waived any need for Plaintiff to comply with the notice requirements demanded of
other claimants under the Governmental Immunity Act. Any other interpretation
would render the notice waiver contained in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1)
superfluous and inoperative. The district court erred in so doing; its decision
should be reversed and this matter remanded.

10

II.

Court Interpretation of Governmental Immunity Supports Plaintiff's
Interpretation of the Statute.
Utah's appellate courts have regularly faced issues related to the

Governmental Immunity Act. In their decisions, these courts have recognized
that Utah has waived immunity for contractual obligations, including the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See. Brown v. Moore. 973 P.2d 950, 954
(Utah 1998); Brown v. Weis. 871 P.2d 552, 563-64 and n.18 (Utah Ct. App.
1994). Utah Appellate Courts have explicitly noted that suits arising against
governmental entities, like Layton City, arising out of contract do not need to be
preceded by the notice provisions otherwise applicable under the Governmental
Immunity Act. See, Neilson v. Gurlev. 888 P.2d 130, 135 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Recently, this Court concluded that a passenger injured while riding in a
State-owned automobile was entitled to assert a claim without satisfying the
notice and claim provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act. See. Neel v.
State. 854 P.2d 581, 582-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). This Court concluded that the
passenger/plaintiff was the third party beneficiary of the State's "contractual"
obligation to provide PIP benefits as a self-insurer. ]d. See, Stewart ex rel.
Womack v. City of Jackson. 804 So.2d 1041, 1044 (Miss. 2002)(similar holding
under arising from third party beneficiary analysis). In another matter, the Utah
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Supreme Court concluded that §63-30-5 governed an unsigned contract for a
right-of-way. See, Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d
1241,1248 (Utah 1990). In that case, the court concluded that even though the
city did not sign the contract, by accepting the grant and paying for an easement,
the city entered into a contract. The Court concluded that the contract waiver
provision of §63-30-5 applied even though the easement was for flood control
purposes, id. It is clear that cases brought before the courts sounding in contract
have been consistently held to be governed by § 63-30-5.
Indeed, those cases where the courts have held notice requirements to be
an issue are distinguishable from the case subjudice. For example, in Hall, a
Utah Department of Corrections officer settled a claim relating to his treatment
while employed, an allegedly unlawful demotion. He received a payment for this
settlement. Hall, at fi3. Subsequently, he resigned from the department and
alleged that the department had made disparaging reports about him to
prospective employers, which prevented him from obtaining employment, id. at
1|5. The court concluded that these tort based claims were subject to the notice
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act. id. at ffl[21-26. This Court took a
similar approach in Broadbent v. Board of Education of Cache County, 910 P.2d
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1274, 1280 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), disposing of Plaintiff's tort claims because of
the Governmental Immunity Act.
There is also support for Plaintiff's position in case law from other
jurisdictions. Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District. 918 P.2d 7
(N.M. 1996), is one such example. New Mexico, like Utah, has a general
statutory scheme creating governmental immunity. In addition, New Mexico has
an exception to the rule established in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-23, through which
the state has waived immunity from suit for actions based on written contracts.
Garcia, like the instant matter, involved a dispute over violations of a
government's entities written employment policies. See. Garcia. 918 P.2d at 9.
The governmental entity challenged the suit arguing that it was immune because
of sovereign immunity. However, the court held that the nature of the defendant's
policies, created an implied employment contract, which fell squarely under the
statutory exception. ]d. at 11-13.
Harris v. State Personnel Bd.. 216 Cal. Rptr. 274 (Ct. App. 1985), is
another example. California's Tort Claims Act establishes immunity from suit,
and contains notice requirements similar to those in Utah's code. ]d. at 276.
However, like Utah, contract actions are expressly exempted from California's
immunity scheme by Cal. Gov't. Code §814. id. In Harris, a state employee
13

brought a claim based on his termination and appeal rights, jd. at 275. The
Harris court noted that the Tort Claims Act excluded actions arising on contract,
and noted that the plaintiff's dispute, centered in his employment contract, did not
sound in tort, and was therefore exempt from statutory notice requirements, jd. at
276.
A similar example is Tennyson v. School District of Menomonie Area. 606
N.W.2d 594 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). In Tennyson, a governmental employee
claimed she was constructively terminated. The governmental agency claimed
that the constructive termination claim was a tort claim masquerading as a
contract claim. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected this argument out of
hand, holding that a constructive termination sounded in contract and therefore
governmental immunity was waived under Wisconsin's immunity statute, id. at
602 n.9. Even when a claim would support both a contract and a tort claim, at
least one court has held that only the tort claim is governed by a state immunity
statute which waives immunity for contract but not tort claims. Koeniq v. City of
South Haven. 597 N.W.2d 99, 104 (Mich. 1999).
Like Garcia, Harris, and Tennyson, the instant matter is a cause of action
centered on Plaintiffs rights under her employment contract as contained in
Defendant's written policies. Like New Mexico, California and Wisconsin, Utah

14

expressly excludes contractual obligations from its governmental immunity
scheme. Other states have reached the same conclusion. CSXTransp.. Inc. v.
City of Garden City. 325 F.3d 1236,1242 n.6 (11 th Cir. 2003)(holding Georgia had
waived sovereign immunity for contract claims); J.P. Asset Co.. Inc. v. City of
Wichita. 70 P.3d 711, 715 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003)(holding that only a tort claimant,
not a contract claimant, need comply with the notice requirements Kansas'
immunity act). Causes of action against governmental entities based on
employment contracts are excluded from the Governmental Immunity Act's
scope, and any notice requirements are waived.
Since the Governmental Immunity Act squarely waives immunity for
contract claims and squarely waives compliance with the notice and claim
provisions of the Act, Plaintiff was not required to provide any notice or claim prior
to filing her complaint. Defendant's invocation of the Act was baseless. The trial
court's determination was erroneous. The trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs
complaint should therefore be reversed and this case remanded.

15

III.

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act Should Be Liberally Construed
in This Case
While Utah's appellate courts have routinely held that compliance with the

Utah Governmental Immunity Act must be strict, the Act itself should be liberally
construed to effectuate its purposes. The Act clearly expresses an intent to not
require compliance with the notice requirements for "any contractual obligation."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1 )(2003). This intent should be broadly and liberally
construed to effectuate the Legislature's purpose in modifying the common law.
"It is generally true that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act expanded
government liability." Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 351
(Utah 1989). The Utah Governmental Immunity Act was therefore in derogation
of the common law. By legislative action, Utah has rejected the canon of
interpretation that provides that statutes in derogation of the common law are to
be strictly construed; the statutes of the state of Utah are to be liberally
construed with a view to accomplishment of the objects of the statutes and to
promote justice. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (2003). This section was expressly
intended to abrogate the common law rule of strict construction of statues which
are in derogation of the common law. See In Re Garr's Estate, 86 P. 757, 761
(Utah 1906).

16

Under this case, the contract provision of the immunity act, § 63-30-5(1),
should be liberally construed. Camas Colorado. 36 P.3d at 138. In this case, the
trial court applied the statute so narrowly as to ignore its express provisions
relating to contracts. Assuming the trial court analyzed the nature of the Plaintiff's
claims, as contained in the complaint, its analysis was so crabbed and unsparing
that it violated the rule that statutes in derogation of the commonly law are to be
liberally construed. The trial court's decision -there was no analysis- was
erroneous. It should be reversed.

Conclusion
Under the plain language of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
immunity is waived for claims arising out of the state's contractual obligations.
Plaintiff filed claims against Layton City based on her employment contract with
the city. These claims are wholly permissible under the Governmental Immunity
Act, and because of their contractual nature, are exempt from the notice and
claim requirements of the act. Moreover, the Act should, in this respect, be
liberally construed to effectuate the Legislative purpose of allowing contract
claims to proceed without compliance with the notice and claim provisions of the
Act. Only this analysis is faithful to the terms of the Act. The decision of the
17

District Court should be reversed and this case remanded for further
proceedings..
DATED this

}{

day of hM

, 2003.
Stevenson & Smith , P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

By:
Brad C. Smith

Certificate of Service
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

1/

day of July, 2003, I mailed,

postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
the following:
Camille Johnson
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11 th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
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Exhibit A
Findings and Order

STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494)
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MACHELLE CANFJJELD,

FINDINGS AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
Case No. 020700620

vs.
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,

Jud

S e Michael G. Allphin

Defendant.

The Court, having reviewed defendant Layton City's Motion to Dismiss and
Memorandum in Support, together with plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss, and being fully advised in the matter hereby finds:
1.

Plaintiff did not file a Notice of Claim against Layton City pursuant to the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act; and
2.

The claims plaintiff has asserted in her Complaint dated November 25, 2002, are

barred by the Governmental Immunity Act.

e* A

Based upon the foregoingfindings,this Court hereby orders plaintiffs Con- plaint
dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs.
DATED this j ^ day of _

_,2003.

B^THE COURT:
STATE OFUTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS
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U<7 . ^ ^ ^ A c t court Judge
- DEPUTY

N \I360-A520\Plead.ngs\O2070O62O\Fmdings and Order
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed FINDINGS AND
ORDER was served on the parties listed below by first class mail, postage prepaid, this ^ £ — "
day of January, 2003.

Brad C. Smith
STEVENSON & SMITH
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden,Utah 84403
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Exhibit B
Complaint

Brad C. Smith, NO. 6656
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 394-4573
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,
i

Sis

^ o o
«o o x _
2 O & o

Civil No.
Judge:

vs.

"
—» o>
o x< JZ °*

COMPLAINT

LAYTON CITY, a Utah
municipality,
Defendant.
Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and complains
and alleges of Defendant as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION & VENUE
1.

Machelle Canfield is a resident of Weber County, Ttate of
Utah.

2.

Defendant Layton City, is a Utah municipality, located in
Davis County, State of Utah.

3.

Venue and jurisdiction are proper in the above-entitled
court.

e« s

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff was employed as a police department dispatcher fo]
Defendant, Layton City.

Prior to July 2001, Plaintiff had

been employed by Defendant for in excess of thirteen (13)
years .

During that period of time she was a police

dispatcher.

Approximately six months prior to the

termination of her employment, Plaintiff was placed under
the charge of a new supervisor, Lisa Murdock.
Ms. Murdock unfairly and unjustly scrutinized the work
performance of Plaintiff and created a hostile, tense and
stressful environment, in an airea that is already stress
ridden.
On 12 June 2 001, Plaintiff left work to take her daughter t
the doctor's office.

Plaintiff reported said hours on her

time sheet.
Due to the stress situation, Plaintiff decided it was best
not to go back to work until Lt. Moyes had returned and we
could resolve the situation.

Plaintiff spoke with Lt. Moyi

on Monday morning, June 11th, and he had asked if Plaintiff
should be alright until he got back.

Plaintiff thought sh

would.
On Tuesday, the 12th, Plaintiff left 4.5 hours early, and
that evening she called dispatch to have her shift filled
for the next day.
Lisa called Plaintiff back and said that Plaintiff needed

be at work.

Plaintiff went to work at 7:00 a.m.

When

Plaintiff came in to work later in the morning, Lisa asked
if she needed to leave.

Plaintiff said if she could skip

lunch and go home early it would be better.

Lisa said she

would see what she could do since she is the lunch relief.
Lisa came up several hours later and told Plaintiff to go t
lunch.

Plaintiff assumed that meant she was not going home

early.
10.

In the meantime Plaintiff's daughter called on he cell phone
and said that her knee and ankle were hurting from the
basketball camp that morning.

(She has had other ankle

injuries).
11.

At 2:00 p.m. Lisa came back to dispatch and told Plaintiff
she could leave.

Plaintiff was surprised.

Plaintiff was

walking out the door and Lisa said she would need a doctor's
excuse for the one hour she was leaving early.
12.

Prior to these incidents, in December, 2000, after being
Plaintiff's supervisor for only a few weeks, Lisa Murdock
demanded that Plaintiff provide medical documentation of
sick leave used at that time.

Plaintiff did not provide

said documentation, although she had it, because she felt
that it was an improper deviation from existing City policy.

13.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges,
that numerous employees of City have used sick leave in the

same manner as Plaintiff but have not been subject to any
disciplinary proceeding whatsoever.

Accordingly, Plaintiff

has been treated differently from and more severely than
other employees of Defendant, all in contravention of
Defendant's specific written policy.
14.

Officers, employees, agents

or servants of Defendant

confronted Plaintiff with the allegation that Plaintiff had
misused sick leave and gave her an ultimatum that she resLg
from the City or face termination.

Because of her fear tha

a termination would preclude her from obtaining future
gainful employment, Plaintiff and reluctantly and against
her will accepted termination.
15.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges
that other employees of City have been subject to
allegations regarding misuse of sick leave and/or other
instances in which they have been accused, rightly or
wrongly, of stealing city property, misusing city time or
similar allegations.

16.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and there upon alleges
that said individuals have not been punished as severely as
she has, have not been terminated, or not given an
ultimatum, but instead, were given employee warnings,
probation, and other punishment.

17.

Defendant's personnel policy specifically require that
Plaintiff be treated fairly and that any punishments or

discipline given to her be proportionate to the offense
alleged.

Defendant's punishment of Plaintiff, including its

termination of her, was disproportionate to the acts
alleged, even if the acts were taken as true.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendant as
follows:
1.

For damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

2.

For reinstatement or other appropriate remedy.

3.

For costs of court and attorney's fees as the same may
be allowed by law.

4.

For such other and further relief as the court deems
just and proper.

DATED this

day of November, 2002.
Brad C. Smith
Attorney for Plaintiff

Plaintiff's Address:
3552 W. 5000 S.
Roy, Utah 84067
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January 30,2003

VIA HAND-DELIVERY
Honorable Judge Michael G. Allphin
District Court Judge
Second District Court
P.O. Box 769
Farmington, UT 84025
Re:

Machelle Canjxeld v. Layton City
Case No, Case No. 020700620

Dear Judge Allphin:
Pursuant to a request from Terry in your office, we submit the enclosed Findings and
Order for your consideration.
Very truly yours,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Canuil/N. Johpson
CNJ/cah
Enclosure
cc:
Brad C. Smith
Gary Crane
James Fisher
N-v!3^7\S2QvCflncspVjtA4s»y Allphin irr.^pd

c * £~

STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
CAMLLE N JOHNSON (A5494)
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468)
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone- (801) 521-9000

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MACHELLE CANFIELD,

FINDINGS AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
Case No. 020700620

vs.
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality,

Jud

& e Michael G. Allphin

Defendant,

The Court, having reviewed defendant Layton City's Motion to Dismiss and
Memorandum in Support, together with plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss, and being fully advised in the matter hereby finds:
1.

Plaintiff did not file a Notice of Claim against Layton City pursuant to the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act; and
2.

The claims plaintiff has asserted in her Complaint dated November 25,2002, are

barred by the Governmental Immunity Act.

Based upon the foregoingfindings,this Court hereby orders plaintiffs Complaint
dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs.
DATED this

day of

, 2003.
BY THE COURT:

Michael G. Allphin
District Court Judge
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